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Combining Actual and Contingent Behavior to Estimate the Value of 
Sports Fishing in the Lagoon of Venice 
 
Summary 
This paper reports the results of a Travel Cost Method (TCM) study about the 
recreational use of the Lagoon of Venice for sports fishing. In April-July 2002, we 
conducted a mail survey of anglers with valid licenses fishing on the Lagoon of Venice 
to gather data on their fishing trips, behaviors and expenditures over the previous year. 
We also asked questions about trips that would be undertaken under hypothetical 
changes in the price of a trip and/or in the catch rate. Actual and hypothetical trips are 
combined to estimate single-site TCM demand function for trips. We propose several 
models to test whether it is acceptable to pool hypothetical and actual trip data, focusing 
on the respondent heterogeneity in the contingent behavior questions. Our models 
suggest actual and contingent behavior are driven by the same demand function, and can 
be pooled for estimation purposes. We use this estimated demand function, and its shift 
when the catch rate is improved, to compute angler surplus at the current catch rate and 
the change in surplus accruing from a 50% improvement in the catch rate. For the 
average angler in our sample, the former is about €1,700 a year, while the latter is about 
€2,800. 
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1. Introduction and Background 
The Lagoon of Venice is a site of exceptional interest, due to its distinctive 
hydrological features and ecosystem, and its unique cultural and social significance.  As 
one of the most important wetland sites in the Mediterranean region, the Lagoon of 
Venice is covered by the European Union’s policy for wetlands preservation,
3 and the 
harvesting of fish and shellfish in the Lagoon is an important local economic activity. 
 At this time, however, the Lagoon of Venice is environmentally degraded, due to 
the industrial pollution from plants and refineries in nearby Porto Marghera, nutrient and 
pesticides in agricultural runoff, and organic pollutants from urban areas and livestock. In 
addition, overfishing by commercial outfits has depleted fish stocks, and biodiversity is 
endangered by an exotic clam species that was artificially introduced for commercial 
fishing during the 1980s. The introduction of the Tapes philippinarum clam has been 
blamed for serious changes in the natural lagoon environment, as harvesting this species 
involves the use of invasive (and illegal) fishing techniques, such as mechanical scrapers, 
which were eventually prohibited (Pranovi and Giovanardi [4]; ICRAM [5]). 
Public programs are currently under consideration that would seek to restore 
environmental balance in the Lagoon by reducing pollution and implementing and 
managing sustainable commercial fishing practices. The latter would result in increased 
                                                 
3 European Community Directive 92/43 “Habitat,” on conservation, defense and improvement of 
environmental quality in sites of European Community interest.   4
fish stocks. In this paper, we use a combination of the travel cost method (TCM) and 
contingent behavior questions to estimate the benefits of increasing fish stocks for one 
category of beneficiaries--recreational anglers.  
The TCM is a frequently used approach for estimating the benefits of 
management policies for natural resource sites and environmental amenities that have 
recreational use value. The method relies on the variation in the travel costs faced by a 
sample of potential and actual visitors to the site, which allows one to estimate the 
demand function for trips at different trip prices. 
When the proposed policy calls for improving the quality at the site, to estimate 
the benefits of such improvements it is necessary to trace out demand for trips to the site 
for a level of site quality that is not currently observed. To circumvent this problem, in 
recent studies researchers have asked individuals to tell them how many trips they would 
take to the site under hypothetical conditions, and have combined the responses to these 
questions—known as contingent behaviors—with observations on actual trips to the site 
under the current conditions. 
Implicit in this approach is the assumption that actual trips and the responses to 
the contingent behavior questions are driven by the same preferences.  If this assumption 
is violated, serious doubts arise about the usefulness of contingent behavior questions and 
on the policy prescriptions based on the responses to these questions.  
In this paper we propose and implement several possible approaches to detect any 
differences between the demand functions implied by actual and contingent behavior 
trips, focusing on the issue of heterogeneity across respondents in their reactions to 
contingent behavior questions. We propose two alternative models for heterogeneity—  5
namely, (i) heterogeneity that is linked with observable individual characteristics, and (ii) 
unobserved heterogeneity.   
Our data suggest that our respondents were comfortable with the hypothetical 
questions, and that their responses to the contingent behavior questions are consistent 
with actual behaviors. We find no evidence of a systematic hypothetical bias that would 
undermine the use of the responses to the hypothetical questions for policy purposes, and 
no evidence of heterogeneity related to individual characteristics in the response to 
hypothetical changes in catch rates. Random-coefficients models suggest that 
heterogeneity, if any, is of an unobserved nature, and confirm that there are no systematic 
hypothetical question effects. 
Earlier research about the difference between hypothetical and actual demand 
functions has produced mixed results. Some studies (e.g., Rosenberger and Loomis [1]) 
find no systematic differences between actual and hypothetical trips. Azevedo et al. [2] 
use state and revealed preference data about trips to wetland resources in Iowa to test four 
hypotheses about responses to contingent behavior questions, concluding that there are 
inconsistencies between stated and revealed preference data.  
Perhaps the most complete study is that conducted by Grijalva et al. [3], who 
elicit actual and contingent behavior trips to rock climbing sites in Texas, and compare 
them with actual trips taken after the proposed policy was implemented. These authors 
find that post-policy trips are more price sensitive than pre-policy trips, but advise that 
caution should be used in interpreting this result.  
  In sum, the contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we produce estimates of 
recreational sports fishing values at current and improved catch rates. Second, since we   6
combine actual and hypothetical trips, we propose and estimate formal models of 
heterogeneity in the response to the hypothetical policy to make sure that actual and 
hypothetical trips belong to the same demand function. These models nicely supplement 
conventional ways of testing for differences across actual and hypothetical behaviors, and 
allow us to conclude that the two types of data can be pooled to estimate the demand for 
fishing trips at current and improved conditions. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the survey 
design and administration. Section III describes the basic TCM approach and Section IV 
the econometric model. Section V describes the survey data and section VI presents the 
estimation results. Section VII reports the welfare variation estimates and section VIII 
provides concluding remarks. 
 
II. Study Design and Administration 
A. Study Design  
In April-July 2002, we conducted a mail survey of anglers with valid fishing 
licenses for the Lagoon of Venice to gather information on their fishing trips to the 
Lagoon (see Appendix A), and the related expenditures over the previous year. We also 
asked questions about trips that would be undertaken under hypothetical changes in the 
price of a trip and in the catch rate. Specifically, we asked them how many trips they 
would take in a year if the price per trip increased by a specified percentage. This 
percentage was varied to the respondent, and was selected at random from five possible 
values (20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100%).   7
Next, we asked respondents how many trips they would take (i) if there was a 
50% increase in the catch rate, and (ii) for a simultaneous increase in the price per trip 
and in the catch rate. This results in a total of four scenarios (current conditions plus three 
hypothetical situations), for a total of four observations on Lagoon fishing trips for each 
respondent, as shown in table 1.
4  
The purpose of the hypothetical questions is to (i) refine our information about the 
demand for trips at the current catch rates, and (ii) estimate the shift in the demand curve 
for trips in the presence of improved catch rates. This shift in the demand function is 
crucial for estimating the benefits of fish stock maintenance to sports anglers. 
Because we wanted to make sure that the hypothetical changes in catch rates were 
acceptable to the respondents, we included in the questionnaire several questions that 
inquire about the respondent’s opinions about and perceptions of environmental quality 
(pollution) and exotic species (the Tapes philippinarum clam) in the Lagoon. We also 
inquired whether the respondent had previously changed his fishing behavior as a result 
of such problems. 
 
B. Survey Administration  
The survey was administered by mail in April-July 2002. In a first wave of 
mailings, we sent questionnaires to 3000 anglers. This sample was drawn from the 
universe of all holders of fishing licenses in the Province of Venice, stratified by distance 
                                                 
4 We therefore have more observations on trips per respondent than many studies published in the 
literature. Rosenberger and Loomis [1],  Azevedo et al. [2] and Hanley et al. [6] for example, only have one 
actual and one hypothetical observation per respondent.   8
of the angler’s place of residence from the Lagoon and age.
5 The survey packet included 
a participation notice card, which was filled out and returned by about 500 anglers.  
In our second wave of mailings, we sent a reminder card to the remaining 2500 
anglers. We received about 500 more participation cards after this reminder. In sum, the 
participation notice card was filled and returned to us by 1048 anglers. Of these, 605 
stated that they did not intend to participate in the survey, while the remaining 443 filled 
out the questionnaire. Out of the latter 443, 269 had gone fishing in the Venice Lagoon in 
the previous 12 months. In this paper, attention is restricted to these 269 individuals.  
 
III. The Model  
  To estimate the value of recreational sports fishing and the welfare change 
associated with changes in the environmental quality of the Lagoon, we use a single-site 
TCM of sports fishing in the Lagoon of Venice. The simplest single-site TCM assumes 
that an individual’s utility depends on aggregate consumption, X, leisure, L and fishing 
trips, r: 
(1)                                                  ) , , ( r L X U U =  
The TCM rests on the assumption of weak complementarity between trips and 
quality at the site, q. In other words,  0 / = ∂ ∂ q U  if r = 0 (the individual does not care 
about quality at the site if he or she does not visit the site), and r is an increasing function 
of  q. The individual chooses X,  L and r to maximize utility subject to the budget 
constraint: 
                                                 
5 Specifically, we created four areas. The first area is the city of Venice, plus the islands of the Lagoon. The 
second area is comprised of population centers on the boarder of the lagoon. The third area population 
centers 5 to 10 kilometers from the Lagoon, and the fourth area is comprised of population centers 10 
kilometers or more from the Lagoon.   9
(2)                              ( ) [] ( ) r d P f X t t r L T w y d ⋅ ⋅ + + = + − − ⋅ + 2 1  
where y is non-work income, T  is total time,   is travel time to the site,   is time spent 
at the site, f is the access fee (if any), P
1 t 2 t
d is the cost per kilometer, and d is the distance to 
the fishing site.
6  
This yields the demand function for trips: 
(3)                                             ( ) q p w y r r r, , , * *=  
where   is the full price of a trip.  () d p f t t w p d r ⋅ + + + = 2 1
In our empirical work, we assume that the demand function is linear in its 
arguments y, w,  , and q. Formally,   r p
(4)                                        q p w r r 3 2 1 0 * β β β β + + + = . 
On appending an error term, equation (4) becomes an econometric model, which 
we estimate after collecting data on trips, pr, w, y, and other individual characteristics 
through our survey of potential and actual Lagoon anglers in the area surrounding 
Venice. 
We have four observations on trips for each respondents, and two sources of 
variation for pr and q, which is here the catch rate: (i) across anglers, and (ii) across 
scenarios within one angler. These sources of variation should be adequate to estimate the 
slope of the demand function,  2 β , and the effect ( 3 β ) of public programs currently under 
consideration that affect water quality and fish stocks, and hence catch rates. 
                                                 
6 This model further assumes that travel time and time spent at the site are given and exogenous, that there 
is no utility or disutility from traveling to the site, and that each trip to the site is undertaken for no other 
purpose than fishing. It also assumes that individuals perceive and respond to changes in travel costs in the 
same way they would to changes in a fee for being admitted to the site (Freeman, [7]). Finally, the model 
assumes that work hours are flexible. The model can be easily amended to allow for endogenous travel and 
visit times, and for fixed work hours.   10
 
IV. The Econometric Model  
A. Basic Econometric Model and Welfare Calculation  
  Absent any response effects due to the hypothetical scenario, our regression 
equation is: 
(5)    
ij
A
ij ij ij i ij p catchrate p TRIPS ε λ δ γ β + + + + = x  
where i = 1, 2, …, n denotes the respondent, and j = 1, …, 4 denotes the scenario. TRIPS 
is the number of trips per year, x is a vector of individual characteristics, p is the cost per 
fishing trip, and catchrate is catch rate, measured in kilograms of fish caught per trip. P
A 
is the price per trip to an alternative fishing destination. (It is also useful to define a 
dummy indicator, Catchj, that takes on a value of one for those scenarios—scenarios 2 
and 4—that posit an improved catch rate.) β, γ, δ and λ are unknown coefficients, and  ij ε  
is an error term.
7  
One caveat is in order. The observations on fishing trips under the four scenarios 
are correlated within an individual if unobservable angler characteristics influence both 
current fishing trips and the announced number of trips under the hypothetical scenarios.  
We therefore adopt a random-effects specification, where we assume that  ij i ij η ν ε + = , 
with  i ν  a respondent-specific, zero-mean component, and  ij η  an i.i.d. error term.  i ν  and 
ij η  are uncorrelated with each other, across individuals, and with the regressors in the 
right-hand side of equation (5).  The presence of the individual-specific component of the 
                                                 
7 As explained below, our respondents reported numerous trips (an average of about 30) to the Lagoon 
every year, which makes the linear model desirable for this specific application.    11
error term ( i ν ) result in correlated error terms ε within a respondent.
8 This means that 
the model must be estimated using Generalized Least Squares.
9 
10
The estimated coefficients are used to calculate two welfare measures. The first 
captures the value of access and is the consumer surplus associated with current fishing 
conditions and prices: 
(6)     []
2
0 0 0 2
1
) , ( γ β
γ
i i i i i p cr p CS + − = x . 
The second captures the value of changes in the quality of the Lagoon of Venice 
as a fishing site, and is the change in surplus due to an improvement in catch rate 
(holding the prices the same): 
(7)   [ ] ) ( 2
2
1
) , ( ) , ( 0 0 0 1 0 γ β δ δ
γ
i i i i i i i i i p cr p CS cr p CS CS + + − = − = ∆
2 x . 
Figure 1 depicts the consumer surplus with and without the improvement in the 
catch rate, assuming for the sake of simplicity that the catch rate variable in the 
econometric equation is a dummy. The surplus with the improvement in the catch rate is 
equal to the area of the triangle AED while the surplus without the improvement is equal 
to the area BEC. So the improvement in the CS is equal to the area ABCD. 
                                                 
8 Specifically,  , where   is the variance of ν, for j≠k, whereas the variance of each 
2 ) ( ν σ ε ε = ik ij E
2
ν σ ij ε  is 
, where   is the variance of η. 
2 2
η ν σ σ +
2
η σ
9 When the price of a trip is raised, some individuals state that they would stop going fishing altogether. We 
experimented with a tobit model with random effects, and found that its coefficients were virtually 
identically to those of the linear model with random effects. Given the difficulty of estimating a random-
coefficient model (see below) superimposed to the tobit equation, in this paper we choose to present the 
results based on the linear model.  
10 Another application that resulted in the estimation of random-effect models is described in Hanley et al. 
[6], who survey beachgoers at five Scottish beaches, asking them to report the number of beach visits, plus 
the number of beach visits that they would undertake if water quality was improved to meet European 
Union standards. Hanley et al. pool the data from hypothetical and actual trips, but do not test for 
hypothetical response effects. In their regressions quality is measured using the Likert scale score assigned 
subjectively by the respondent to water quality, rather than an objective measure of water quality.   12
 
B. Testing for Hypothetical Questions Effects 
  Equation (5) posits that when the price and the catch rate are varied to the 
respondents in the hypothetical scenarios, the effect on trips is the same as what would be 
observed through the cross-sectional variation in actual prices and catch rates.  As 
previously explained, it is important to test if this assumption is borne out in the data.   
  This can be done by amending equation (5) to include a dummy variable, 
henceforth denoted as Catch, which takes on a value of one for the observations 
corresponding to scenarios 2 and 4, which posit improved catch rates. Formally, the new 




ij ij ij i ij p Catch catchrate p TRIPS ε λ δ δ γ β + + + + + = 2 1 x .
  We wish, therefore, to test the null hypothesis that  . 0 2 = δ  Implicit in this testing 
procedure is the assumption that any hypothetical bias in the contingent behavior 
responses is constant across individuals.  
  It is, however, possible that the difference between the demand functions implied 
by actual and contingent behaviors, if any, varies across anglers. For example, it might be 
argued that the plausibility of the improved scenarios (and hence the reliability of the 
angler’s response) varies with the past fishing experiences and skills, education, age, and 
perceptions of pollution.   
Clearly, this type of heterogeneity in the reaction to the contingent behavior 
questions is related to observable variables.  To see if this is the case, we add in the right-
hand side of the model interactions between the Catch dummy and variables these 
factors.  Rejection of the null that the coefficient(s) on the interaction(s) is (are) equal to   13
different from zero would support the notion of observable heterogeneity in the reaction 
to the contingent behavior questions.   
Finally, we allow for the possibility that there is heterogeneity in the response to 
the contingent behavior question about catch rate, but that this heterogeneity cannot be 
linked with observable characteristics. We propose to model this unobserved 




ij i ij ij i ij p Catch Catchrate catchrate p TRIPS ε λ δ δ γ β + + × + + + = 2 1 ) ( x  
Where  i 2 δ  is a random coefficient that varies across respondent, but is fixed across the 
observations contributed by the same angler. In other words, we assume that 
i i ξ δ δ + = 2 2 , where  2 δ  is the expectation of  i 2 δ , and  i ξ  is a normally distributed error 
term with mean zero and variance  .  Equation (9) can, therefore, be re-written as  
2
ξ σ
(10)  ] [ ) ( 2 i ij ij
A
ij ij ij ij i ij CCrate p CCrate catchrate p TRIPS ξ ε λ δ δ γ β ⋅ + + + + + + = x , 
Where CCrate=catchrate×catch, and all unobserved terms have been gathered inside the 
brackets.  
In equation (10), the ε terms are iid and that they do not contain any individual-
specific effects. By contrast, the overall errors—the terms in the brackets—are 
heteroskedastic and correlated overall an individual angler, due to the presence of the ξs. 
It is easily shown that the variances of the term in the brackets are equal to 
, and that the covariance between any two error terms within the same 
individual is    for j≠k. The error terms in the brackets in (10) are 
uncorrelated across anglers.  
2 2 2
i CCrate ⋅ + ξ ε σ σ
ik ij Ccrate CCrate ⋅ ⋅
2
ξ σ  14
Model (10) is, therefore, estimated by (feasible) generalized least squares by 
minimizing 
(11)   ,  ∑
=
− − ′ −
n
i
i i i i ] [ ] [ i θ Z y A θ Z y
1
where y is a 4×1 vector of observations on trips, Z is a matrix of suitable dimensions with 
all the right-hand side variables of equation (10), θ is the vector of all regression 
coefficients in (10), and A is the matrix of error variances and covariances within 
individual i. We adopt an iteratively re-weighted least squares algorithm to obtain the 
GLS estimates.   
 
C. The Choice of Regressors in the Econometric Model 
  Economic theory suggests that the demand for fishing trips should depend on the 
full price of a trip, which includes the opportunity cost of time (see section 2).
11 
Measuring the opportunity cost of time, however, is fraught with difficulties,
12 which is 
the reason why we prefer to enter out-of-pocket price (pricee
13) and income separately in 
our model.  
  We further include (i) household income divided by the number of household 
members (PCAPINC), (ii) a dummy that takes on a value of one if the respondent did not 
                                                 
11 Earlier literature (since Cesario, [8]) has suggested that the opportunity cost of time should be about one-
third of the market wage rate, and McConnell and Strand [9] have suggested an approach for estimating 
this fraction directly from the data reported by the respondent in a TCM survey. Recently, Feather and 
Shaw [10] [11] have proposed approaches for computing the value of time for individuals who are 
employed but do not choose the number of hours they works, and for individuals who choose not to work. 
12 Azevedo et al.[2] argue that the opportunity cost of price is likely to be measured with error, and that this 
may be well be one possible reason for differences in the slope of the actual and hypothetical demands for 
trips. 
13 Pricee is the sum of boat fuel costs, the cost of the car trip (fuel, wear-and-tear, and highway toll), the fee 
for launching the boat from a boat ramp, the cost of bait, and food and beverages.   15
answer the question about household income,
14 and (iii) a dummy (RETIRED) indicating 
whether the respondent is retired from the workforce, which captures time constraints, 
among other things. 
  When estimating a single-site TCM model, it is important to control for the price 
of a trip to an alternative site. Due to the extension of the Lagoon of Venice, its location, 
nature and species, there are very few sites that may serve as substitutes for it for sports 
fishing. We argue that only the Lagoon of Marano serves as a reasonable substitute for it, 
but only for those anglers in our sample that are not residents of Venice. For logistical 
reasons, the latter would find it extremely time consuming and costly to get their cars and 
drive to the Lagoon of Marano, with their boats in tow. Accordingly, we control for the 
travel cost to a substitute site by including the price of a trip to Marano (MARANO2), 
plus a dummy denoting whether the angler is a resident of the city of Venice. If so, we 
recode MARANO2 to zero.  Finally, we include an additional regressor, BOAT, a 
dummy variable denoting use of the angler’s own boat to go fishing.  
 
V. The Data  
A. Fishing Trips and Socio-demographics  
The sample we examine in this paper is comprised of 269 individuals who report 
having taken fishing trips in the Lagoon of Venice over the last 12 months.  
                                                 
14 Specifically, we create a dummy (PCAPINCMISS) taking on a value of one for those respondents who 
did not answer the household income question. If PCAPINCMISS=1, we recode income per household 
member (PCAPINC) to zero. Both PCAPINC and PCAPINCMISS must be entered in the right-hand side 
of the regression. The latter variable captures any systematic differences in fishing trips among those 
respondents who did and did not report information about their incomes. The coefficient of PCAPINC 
captures the net effect of the opportunity cost of time and any other ways in which income affects the 
demand for trips.   16
Descriptive statistics of the sample are reported in table 2. As shown in table 2, 
virtually all of the anglers in our sample are males. The average respondent is about 50 
years old, has had about 10 years of schooling, and has an annual household income of 
€20,000. Retired persons account for about one-third of the sample.
15
Regarding fishing behavior and experience, the average respondent reports taking 
about 30 trips a year in the Lagoon, for a total expenditure of about €765 a year. The 
average cost per trip is €31. On average, our anglers have been fishing in the Lagoon for 
26 years, and more than 50% use their own boat on their Lagoon fishing trips. 
In analyses not reported in this paper, we also found that Fascia A (=city of 
Venice) residents tend to be slightly older than the residents of other areas, their average 
age being 55 years versus 45-49. The Fascia A subsample tends to include more retired 
persons than the remainder of the sample (40% versus 15-39%). The average cost of a 
fishing trip is similar across zones, but Fascia A respondents take more fishing trips than 
the others (see Alberini et al. [12]).  
 
B. Fishing Trips by Scenario 
  Under the current conditions, our subjects reported an average of 30 trips to the 
Lagoon in the 12 months prior to the survey. About 39 percent of the respondent took one 
to 12 trips, 35 percent took 13-30 trips, and 26 percent took more than 30. 
    When asked to consider a hypothetical situation with higher prices per trip, 
respondents announced that they would either keep the number of trips the same, or that 
                                                 
15 The proportion of retired persons among Lagoon anglers is higher than among all holders of fishing 
license in the Province of Venice (18.3 %). The reason is that Lagoon sport fishing is closely related to 
traditional fishing in the Lagoon and hence requires plentiful time. Furthermore, the average age of people 
living in the historical center of Venice is higher than the one living outside.   17
they would take fewer trips. The average number of trips per year under scenario 2 is 14, 
with 38% of the respondents stating that they would no longer going fishing.  
  Under scenario 3, which has higher catch rates, people generally told us that they 
would take more trips, for an average of almost 39 per year. Under scenario 4, which 
posits higher prices and a higher catch rate, the average number of announced trips is 21, 
with 28% of the respondents reporting an intended number of trips equal to zero. 
These figures suggest that the responses to the hypothetical trip questions are reasonable 
and consistent with well-behaved demand functions.
16
 
C. Perception of Environmental Quality in the Lagoon of Venice 
Our questionnaire also queries anglers about their perception of environmental 
quality in the Lagoon. We use three questions to explore this matter. The first asks 
whether the presence of chemical pollutants and industrial waste in the Lagoon is thought 
to affect catch rates. The second question asks the respondents if they feel that catch rates 
have been negatively affected by the introduction of the tapes philippinarum clam. The 
third question asks the respondent if he has changed his own fishing behavior as a result 
of pollution and this new species. Two response categories (yes and no) are provided for 
each of these questions.   
We found that the majority of our respondents (91.9%) thought that pollution 
influences catch rates in the Lagoon. Eighty-two percent of our anglers felt that catch 
rates had been negatively impacted by the introduction of the tapes philippinarum clam, 
                                                 
16 These aggregate figures suggest that the elasticity of trips with respect to price is roughly one, while that 
with respect to catch rate is roughly 0.6.  This is broadly consistent with the characteristics of the sample, 
and with the presence of many retired persons with low incomes and high trip rates at the current 
conditions.   18
and 78% of them have actually changed their own fishing behavior as a result of 
pollution and exotic species. These response patterns suggest that anglers are aware of the 
potential effects of water quality and exotic species on catch rate, and they should accept 
hypothetical scenarios where improvements in catch rates are delivered by water quality 
and fishing management policies. 
  
VI. Results   
A. Models of Actual Trips 
We begin our analysis with reporting and discussing the results of an OLS 
regression where the sample is restricted to actual trips. The results of this run are 
reported in table 3, column (A).   
In this regression, the coefficient on price per trip is negative, as expected, and 
significant. Its magnitude, -0.14, implies that it takes an increase in price per trip of 10 
euro to see a decrease of 1.4 in expected trips. The coefficient on MARANO2 is positive, 
as expected for the price of a substitute site, but insignificant, and that on FASCIAA is 
15.34, implying that Venice residents take on average 15 more fishing trips than persons 
who live elsewhere in the study region.  
The coefficient on CATCHRATE is large and significant. Any additional kilo of 
fish per trip raises fishing trips by almost 10 a year. Regarding income, the coefficient on 
this variable is negative, suggesting that it indeed captures the opportunity cost of time. 
The effect is strongly significant. Those persons who did not report their income are not 
significantly different from those who did in terms of trips, despite the large coefficient 
on PCAPINCM. Retired persons and boat owners take more trips than the other   19
respondents, but the coefficients on these dummies are estimated imprecisely and only 
that on the latter is significant (at the 10% level).  
 
B. Random-effects Models, Full Panel  
In columns (B)-(D), we report the results of regressions that exploit the full panel 
of data, including intended trips at hypothetical conditions. To see the effect of the 
hypothetical trip data, compare column (B) with column (A): The coefficient on price in 
column (B) is -0.13, changing by less than 6% with respect to its counterpart in A. We 
conclude that the responses to the contingent behavior questions do not alter the slope of 
the demand function estimated using actual trips.  
We therefore turn to examining whether this is true of the quality variable, the 
catch rate. The coefficient on catch rate in column (B) is 5.54, and is thus much lower (a 
43% reduction) than the estimate we obtained from the cross-sectional regression that 
uses only actual trips.
17
In column (C), we add the CATCH dummy to capture any differences in the 
sensitivity to the quality of the Lagoon across actual and contingent behavior trips. The 
coefficient on catch is negative, which is consistent with the changes observed from (A) 
to (B), but insignificant. The coefficients on the other regressors are similar to their 
counterparts in (B).  
Our first check for possible heterogeneity across respondents in their sensitivity to 
contingent changes in catch rate is shown in column (D), where we drop CATCH and 
                                                 
17 The coefficients on the remaining variable are similar to their counterparts in (A), except for that on 
income, which changes by 22%. The error terms within a respondent are indeed correlated, as implied by 
the random effects models, and the correlation coefficient between any two of them is 0.58.  
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enter the interaction term CATCH×CATCHRATE. This, however, results in an 
insignificant coefficient and brings little changes relative to (B) and (C). This implies that 
anglers do not react to hypothetical catch rates any differently than we would infer from 
the cross-sectional variation in actual rates.  
Table 4 reports selected coefficients from random-effects models that include 
CATCHRATE, CATCH and various interactions between CATCH and individual 
characteristics of the respondent. We find little evidence of any effects that depend on 
observable characteristics of the respondent.  
Next, we check whether the demand for trips and the sensitivity to hypothetical 
catch rates varies with the beliefs held by the respondent about pollution and with 
whether he has previously adjusted fishing behavior in reaction to the quality of the 
Lagoon. We do so by fitting separate regressions for two groups of respondents—those 
who did and did not change fishing behavior (CAMBIA=1 or 0, respectively)—but, as 
shown in table 5, found no differences across the estimated demand functions. We 
attempted the same approach for INQUI and VOGO, but this time one of the two groups 
was too small to result in a meaningful demand functions. 
The estimation results for our preferred specification of the random-coefficients 
model are displayed in table 6. This specification can be compared to the random-effects 
model of (D) in table 3. There is evidence of some heteroskedasticity across respondents 
and correlation of the responses within anglers, as implied by the estimates of  ξ σ and  ε σ , 
but no evidence of a systematic hypothetical bias to changes in catch rates.  
 
VII. Welfare Estimates   21
We use the simplest specification of our random-effects model (column (B), table 
3) to predict angler surplus at the current conditions and the surplus change for a 50% 
improvement in catch rates.  Surplus figures are displayed in table 7. At the average price 
per trip (€31.23) and income per household member (€7920.64 a year) in our sample, 
surplus at the current conditions is pegged at €1,774 a year, while the welfare change 
associated with the catch rate improvement is €1,056 a year. 
The welfare calculations can be specialized to the residents of Venice 
(FASCIAA=1) and of the other areas in our sample (FASCIAA=0). Holding the price per 
trip the same across these two groups, but setting income per household member to 
€8474.55 for Venice residents and to €7391.00 for all others, we obtain surplus figures at 
the current conditions of €3043 a year for Venice residents and €769 a year for all others. 
A 50% change in catch rates yields surplus changes of €1379 a year for Venice residents 
and €745 a year for all others.  
We use these two strata—residents of Venice (FASCIAA=1) and all others 
(FASCIAA=0)—to estimate the benefits of improvements of the sports fishing activity. 
We denote our welfare measure of interest with  , where   is a vector of 
regressors and   is a vector of estimated coefficients. The welfare measure for the 
population is, therefore, equal to: 
) ˆ , ( β k S x k x
β ˆ
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where   is the number of Lagoon anglers in stratum k in the population, k=1 denotes 
Venice residents and k=2 Lagoon anglers who reside in other areas.   is the 
surplus at the current conditions in our first estimation exercise, and the welfare change 
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for stratum k associated with the catch rate improvement in our second estimation 
exercise.  
For simplicity, in this paper attention is restricted to those anglers who currently 
go fishing in the Lagoon of Venice, ignoring the possibility that improvements in catch 
rates might entice other persons to go fishing in the Lagoon. This assumption leads to 
conservative benefit estimates.  
No one knows exactly N1 and N2, the populations of Lagoon anglers that reside in 
Venice and in all other areas, respectively.  In this paper, we offer estimates of these 
populations based on conservative assumptions.
18 We start with pointing out that the 
universe of fishing licenses valid in the Province of Venice is comprised of a total of 
34018 persons. Of these, 4415 are residents of Venice and Lagoon islands, while the 
remaining 29603 live in other areas (for the most part, the inland portion of the Province 
of Venice, with some residents of the Provinces of Treviso and Padua).
19
The first estimate is based on the conservative assumption that only the holders of 
fishing licenses that actually go fishing in the Lagoon bother to return the completed 
questionnaire,
20 and that our sample reflects the Lagoon fishing participation rates of the 
population. Since the questionnaire was returned by 13.4% of the recipients with Venice 
and Lagoon islands addresses, and 7.1% of the other recipients, we estimate N1 to be 
equal to (4415*0.134)=591 and N2 to be equal to (29603*0.071)=2102. The surplus 
associated with current fishing conditions is, therefore, €1,798,773 a year for Venice 
                                                 
18 See Alberini et al. [12] for an alternate, and more generous, calculation of N1 and N2. 
19 We remind the reader that N1 and N2 are not the same as the number of holders of valid fishing licenses 
for the Province of Venice that reside in Venice and in other areas, respectively. This is because purchase 
of the fishing license entitles access to and use of many bodies of water in the Province of Venice, of which 
the Lagoon of Venice is only one. N1 and N2 are, therefore, less than or equal than 4415 and 29603, 
respectively.   23
residents and €1,617,047 for residents of other areas who go fishing in the Lagoon, for a 
total of €3,415,820 a year. The welfare change figures associated with a 50% 
improvement in catch rates are €812,113 and €1,566,620, for a total of €2,378,733 a year. 
We remind the reader that these figures are not the only benefits of a proposed 
fish stocks maintenance policy: The total benefits include the benefits experienced by 
other categories of beneficiaries of the policy, such as commercial fishing outfits, other 
types of recreationists, plus the benefits of those anglers who start fishing as a result of 
the improved catch rates in the Lagoon. Once the full benefits of the policy are estimated, 
they can be compared with the costs of the program in a full-blown benefits-cost analysis.   
 
VIII. Discussion and Conclusions 
We have surveyed anglers who go fishing in the Lagoon of Venice to gather 
information about the frequency of their Lagoon fishing trips and cost incurred. We have 
then used this information to estimate a single-site TCM equation explaining trips as a 
function of cost per trip and other factors. In doing so, we have augmented our 
observations on actual trips and costs with the trips our respondents told us they would 
undertake under hypothetical changes in the cost per trip and in the catch rate. This 
additional information has allowed us to improve the efficiency of our estimate of the 
slope of the trip demand function. It has also allowed us to estimate the shift in the 
demand function associated with a 50% improvement in catch rate.  
One key aspect of our research is the care we have taken to check that the 
responses to hypothetical scenarios reflect the same preferences as actual trips. We have 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 Under this assumption, a person who received the questionnaire but did not fill it out is held to never go 
fishing in the Lagoon.    24
(a) compared demand functions based on actual and pooled actual-hypothetical trips, (b) 
estimated models with pooled data with dummies to check for hypothetical effects, and 
(c) tested extensively for heterogeneity in the response to the hypothetical scenario 
questions. In (c), we checked for both heterogeneity linked to observable characteristics 
of the responses, and to unobservable heterogeneity, which resulted in random-coefficient 
models.  
We found no evidence that the responses to the actual and hypothetical questions 
are driven by different sets of preferences. Our results can be compared with those of 
Rosenberger and Loomis [1], who report no significant differences in the slope of the 
demand function for trips across actual and contingent behaviors. Azevedo et al. [2] find 
that there are significant differences in the coefficients on price across actual and 
hypothetical trips. In their study, people tend to be more responsive to price in the 
revealed preference data.
21 (Azevedo et al. [2], however, are careful to point out that the 
price of a trip is likely to be measured with an error, since the opportunity cost of time, 
one of the components of the price per trip, is imputed by the researcher.) By contrast, 
Grijalva et al. [3] find that pre-policy trips are less price-sensitive than post-policy trips. 
Various cross-checks in our questionnaire further confirm that our data are 
reasonable and credible.  Based on the results of our econometric models and on other 
evidence from our data, we believe that, with the due caution, our figures could be used 
for policy purposes.  We illustrate a possible policy use of our figures by computing total 
surplus of access to the Lagoon of Venice, and the surplus change associated with 
policies that improve catch rates.   
                                                 
21 By contrast, respondents gave heavier weight to the wage rate in the hypothetical scenarios.  
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To compute the population surplus and surplus change, it is necessary to multiply 
the surplus (surplus change) by the number of anglers who do fish in the Lagoon. No one 
knows exactly how many anglers visit the Lagoon, and how many of these anglers are 
Venice residents or residents of other areas. Based on conservative assumptions about the 
total number of Lagoon anglers, we obtain estimates of surplus at the current conditions 
of €3.4 million and of surplus change if catch rates improve of €2.4 million a year. 
Conversations with officials of the Province of Venice suggest that this conservative 
assumption is reasonable.  
It should be kept in mind, however, that our calculations do not account for 
persons who do not go fishing in the Lagoon at this time, but could be enticed to do so if 
catch rates improved. Moreover, any benefit-cost analyses of proposed policies that seek 
to improve environmental quality and fish stocks in the Lagoon should also examine the 
benefits brought by these policies to other categories of beneficiaries, in addition to 
Lagoon anglers. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Survey Design. 
Scenario  Type  Price per trip  Catch rate 
1  Actual   Actual price per trip (pi0) Current  conditions  (cri0) 
2  Hypothetical   Higher price: (pi1 = (1+X)pi0), where 
X is selected at random out of 
{0.20, 0.40, 0.60, 0.80, 1.00} 
Current conditions (cri0) 
3  Hypothetical  Actual price per trip (pi0)  Increase of 50% over current 
conditions: cri1 = cri0 · (1 + 0.5) 
4  Hypothetical   Higher price: (pi1 = (1+X)pi0), where 
X is the same as in scenario 2 
Increase of 50% over current 
conditions: cri1 = cri0 · (1 + 0.5) 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the sample (n=269). 
Variable  Sample average  
(standard deviation in parentheses) 
Individual characteristics of the respondent 
Age (ETA) (years)   51.22 
(14.74) 
Male (SEX) (dummy)  0.985 
(0.12) 








Annual Income per member of the 







Years of schooling (EDUCATION)  9.80 
(3.83) 
Fishing behavior and experience 




Number of fishing trips in the Lagoon in 
the last 12 months (QVPLA) 
30.28 
(35.30) 




Numbers of years the respondent has been 
fishing in the Lagoon (DQAP) 
26.37 
(16.76) 








* Calculated for those respondents who do report household income.    30
Table 3 – Travel cost models. Dependent variables: fishing trips per year (t statistics in 
parentheses). 
















































































R-square  0.2351 0.1625 0.1638 0.1648 
N  267  1068 1068 1068 
ε σ ˆ   30.85     
ν σ ˆ     25.24 25.23 25.24 
η σ ˆ     21.30 21.31 21.30 
correlation    0.5840 0.5837 0.5840 
Model A = linear regression model, only 1 observation per person, actual number of trips 
only. Model B, C, D = linear models, random effects, 4 observations per person. 
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Table 4. Random-effects models to test for systematic heterogeneity in the response to 
the hypothetical catch rates. (t statistics in parentheses). 




































































































































































       
CATCH*FASCIAA   4.7567 
(1.82) 




   4.2205 
(1.62) 




    2.5166 
(0.95) 
    
CATCH*PCAPINC       -0.0001 
(-0.70) 
   
CATCH*BOAT        -2.0162 
(-0.76) 
  
C A T C H * E D U C          - 0 . 5 2 2 0  
(-1.63) 
 
C A T C H * I N Q U I           0 . 7 0 3 2  
(0.16) 
C A T C H * C A M B I A           - 1 . 5 5 2 1  
(-0.51) 
CATCH*VOGO          -0.2828 
(-0.09) 
R-square    0.1638  0.1646 0.1636 0.1630 0.1640 0.1640 0.1686 0.1645 
N  1068  1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 
ν σ ˆ   25.23  25.24 25.27 25.22 25.23 25.23 25.01 25.32 
η σ ˆ   21.32  21.27 21.27 21.29 21.31 21.31 21.31 21.34 
correlation  0.5833  0.5846 0.5852 0.5838 0.5835 0.5834 0.5794 0.5845 
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Table 5. Estimated coefficients for selected regressors in random effects models for 














(t = 1.90) 
6.0652 
(t = 4.98) 
Too unstable to 
compare 
Too unstable to 
compare 
CATCH -0.3669 
(t = -0.07) 
-1.3156 
(t = -0.56) 
Too unstable to 
compare 
Too unstable to 
compare 
CAMBIA=dummy equal to one if the respondents changed behaviors in response to 
perceived pollution problems.  
INQUI= dummy equal to one if the respondents perceive that pollution problems have 
seriously damaged the lagoon environment.  
VOGO= dummy equal to one if the respondents perceive that tapes philippinarum 
introduction has seriously changed the natural lagoon environment. 
 
 






















ξ σ ˆ   27.64 
ε σ ˆ   28.57 
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Table 7. Surplus and surplus changes after 50% catch rate improvement.  
Based on specification (B), table 3. 
Anglers  Surplus at current 
catch rate 




(€ per year) 
Surplus  
difference 
(€ per year) 
All respondents   1774.06  2830.38  1056.32 
Respondents living in 
the city of Venice and 
the islands of the 
Lagoon (ZONA=1) 
3043.61 4422.82  1379.21 
Respondents living in 
other areas 
(ZONA=2, 3, or 4) 
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